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I. STATEMENT OF
A.

CASE

Nature of the Case

This is a medical negligence and products liability case wherein Carol English and Eric
English ("Piaintiffs") failed to commence their medical negligence action against Eastern Idaho
Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC") and James
Taylor, D.O. ("Dr. Taylor") within the applicable statute of limitations. As a result of the
untimely filing, EIRMC and Dr. Taylor were granted summary judgment and dismissed from the
matter.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The district court 6rranted EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's motions for summary judgment on
June 23, 2014 on the basis that pursuant to Idaho Supreme Court case law precedent Plaintiffs
did not commence their action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor until after the applicable statute of
limitations had expired. R. Vol. 2, pp. 214-220.
On October 29, 2014 the dist1ict court denied Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration;
holding that pursuant to the Erie doctrine the commencement of the statute of limitations is a
substantive issue, hence, state law controls, and pursuant to Idaho state law Plaintiffs did not
commence their action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor until after the applicable statute of
limitations had expired. R. Vol. 2, pp. 320-327. The trial court entered an "Order Granting
Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgments of Dismissal of Medical Defendants and Rule
54(b) Certification" on January 21, '.WIS. R. Vol. 2, pp. 336-338.

1
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Statement of Facts
Counsel for Plaintiffs repeatedly assured counsei for EIRMC that Plaintiffs would not file
a lawsuit against EIRMC. As late as April 26, 2013, Plaintiffs' counsel once again assured
counsel for EIRMC that Plaintiffs would not be initiating a lawsuit against EIRMC in this matter.
R. Vol. 1, p. 144. On September 13, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Idaho state court
against Cook Incorporated, Cook :Medical Incorporated, Cook Medical Technologies, LLC
("Cook Defendants"), and Does 1-20. R. Vol. 1, pp. 9-15. The Complaint was brought pursuant
to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 6-1401 et seq. (the Idaho Product Liability Act). R. Vol. 1, pp.
9-10. Plaintiffs' September 13, 2013, Complaint did not state a claim for medical negligence nor
did it name EIRMC as a defendant. R. Vol. 1, pp. 9-15. On September 17, 2013, Plaintiffs filed
an Amended Complaint against the Cook Defendants and Does 1-20. R. Vol. L pp. 16-23. The
Amended Complaint was brought pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§ 6-1401 et seq. R.
Vol. 1, pp.16-17. Plaintiffs' September 17, 2013, Amended Complaint did not state a claim for
medical negligence nor did it name EIRMC as a defendant. R. Vol. 1, pp. 16-23.
On October 31, 2013, the Cook Defendants filed a Notice of Removal removing this state
court action to federal court under diversity of citizenship. R. Vol. 1, p. 1. On November 5,
2013, the Cook Defendants filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in federal comt.
R. Vol. 1, p. 50. On December 10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed in federal court a Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Complaint to add EIRMC and Dr. Taylor as parties and add claims for
medical negligence. R. Vol. 1, p. 50. Plaintiffs did not serve copies of the Motion for Leave to
File Second i\mended Complaint or the proposed Second ,,:\mended Complaint upon EIRMC.

2
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federal court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for
January 16, 2014. R. Vol.

to File Second Amended Complaint on

L p. 50. Plaintiffs filed their Second /\.mended Complaint in federal

court on January 16, 2014. Id. The January 16, 2014 Second Amended Complaint for the first
time raised a claim of medical negligence and for the first time named EIRMC as a defendant.
On January 17, 2014, Plaintiffs and the Cook Defendants entered into a stipulation
agreemg:
Counsel for the parties in this matter hereby stipulate that the Plaintiffs' filing of
the Second Amended Complaint in this matter deprives the United States District
Court for the District ofldaho of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
144 7(e) and that the filing of such Second Amended Complaint requires that this
mater be remanded to the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Bonneville County.
R. Vol. 1, p. 52.
Pursuant to the stipulation, the federal court entered an order on January 21, 2014,
wherein it stated:
... it appearing from the suggestion of the parties that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction and the parties having stipulated to remand the case to state
court,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is remanded to the
district court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho, In and For the
County of Bonneville, Case No. CV-13-04868 ...
R. Vol. 2, p. 291.
On January 27, 2014, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was filed in Idaho state
court. R. Vol. 1, p. 35. According to the Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff Carol English
underwent an epistaxis embolization procedure on September 17, 2011. R. Vol. L p. 36. The

3
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Fifth Cause of Action in the Second Amended Complaint alleges medical negligence against
EIRMC. R. Vol. 1, p. 41. Counsel for Plaintiffs contacted counsel for EIRMC via telephone on
February 3, 2014 regarding acceptance of service of process and was told that per company
policy EIRMC would have to be served through its registered agent. R. Vol.

L p. 47.

February

3, 2014 was the first time EIRMC was notified that a lawsuit had been filed against it. EIRMC
was served with a copy of the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint and state court Summons
on February 25, 2014. R. Vol. 1, p. 3.
Plaintiffs' application and claim for medical malpractice prelitigation hearing against
EIRMC and Dr. Taylor ( consisting of a mere thirty-seven words) was stamped as received by the
Idaho State Board of Medicine on September 16, 2013. R. Vol. 1, pp. 46-47. The Advisory
Opinion of the prelitigation screening panel was received by the Idaho State Board of Medicine
on November 18, 2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 47. There is no dispute that the statute of limitations on
any claims by Plaintiffs against EIRMC expired on December 19, 2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 72.
On March 4, 2014 (after the federal district court remanded this case back to state court,
was divested of jurisdiction, and after EIRMC had been served with the Second A.mended
Complaint) Plaintiffs filed a Rule 60 Motion to Clarify Docket Entry Order in federal court. R.
Vol. 2. pp. 283-284. Contrary to Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, there was no challenge to their
lawsuit prior to them filing their Rule 60 motion in federal court. Plaintiffs must have realized
their statute of limitations mistake because their Rule 60 Motion to Clarify was filed in federal
court ten (10) days before EIRMC even filed and served its motion for summary judgment on
March 14, 2014 and before Dr. Taylor was even served with process. Because EIRMC was

4
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never a party to the federal court proceedings and because copies of Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify
were never served upon EIRMC, Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify was unopposed. The federal court
entered an order on the Motion to Clarify on April 9, 2014. R. Vol. 2, p. 240.
Plaintiffs did not cite to or mention the April 9, 2014, federal court order in their briefing
opposing EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's motions for summary judgment or during the May 5, 2014,
hearing on EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's motions for summary judgment. R. Vol. 1, pp. 69-121:
194-201;

., pp. 17-26; 32-33. The state district court granted EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's

motions for summary judgment on June 23, 2014. R. Vol. 2, pp. 214-220. The first time
Plaintiffs disclosed the April 9, 2014, federal court order was when they attached it as part of
their Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 7, 2014. At the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration, Judge Jon J. Shindurling commented on the April 9, 2014 federal court order:
What gives me, really, concern here. Ms. Casperson, is this going back to Judge
Lodge in March -- after he's tendered jurisdiction to this Court -- ex parte,
without notice to the defendants who are now in the case, and getting an
additional order from Judge Lodge. That seems to me to be a violation of ethical
rules, if nothing else.

I would not have had any trouble had you approached him but notified the parties
that there was a hearing on the matter.

... [T]hey have a right to notice that you've filed a motion because it deals with
their substantive rights in this case.
Tr.. pp. 41-43; LL 1-7; 24-25; 1, 4-6.
The district court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on October 29. 2014. R.
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pp. 320-327.
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is EIRMC entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§
12-121 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules?

III. ARGUMENT
A. Summary of Argument

This case is a matter of Plaintiffs failing to commence their action against EIRMC within
the applicable statute of limitations. On- appeal Plaintiffs have flipped or reversed the way this
case was presented to the district court. At the district court level, EIRMC and Dr. Taylor moved
for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs did not commence the present lawsuit against
them until after the statute oflimitations had expired. The district court, pursuant to this Court's
decisions in Griggs v. Nash, 116 ldaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989) and Terra-West, Inc. v. Jdaho
Mut. Trust. LLC, 150 Idaho 393,247 P.3d 620 (2010), granted EIRMC and Dr. Taylor summary

judgment in this matter. R. Vol. 2, pp. 214-220.
Next, Plaintiffs attempted to argue that the commencement of their state derived action
against EIRMC for statute oflimitations purposes was a procedural issue as opposed to a
substantive issue and that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the federal case law
interpreting said rule governed this matter. However, the district court. pursuant to
overwhelming federal law precedent, held the commencement of the statute oflimitations is a
substantive issue, Idaho state law controls, and accordingly denied Plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration (upholding the grant of summary jud61111ent to EIRMC and Dr. Taylor). R. Vol.

6
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320-327.
EIRMC will present its arguments in this brief in the order such arguments were
presented to the district comi so that the reasoning and decisions of the district court can be more
easily followed on appeal.
Idaho Supreme Court case law precedent provides that in a situation where a party files a
motion for leave to file a third party complaint the third party action does not commence until,
pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the third party complaint is filed
with the court (not when the motion for leave is filed). Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,234, 775
P.2d 120, 126 (1989). Idaho Supreme Court case law precedent provides that in a situation
where an individual or entity is not a party to a lawsuit when an existing party files a motion to
add the individual or entity to the lawsuit the non-party must receive notice of the impending
action1substance of the proposed amendment prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations. Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,234, 775 P.2d 120, 126 (1989); Terra-West. Inc. v.
Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 399-400, 247 P.3d 620, 626-627 (2010). Idaho Supreme

Court case law precedent further provides an exclusive "either/or" list of what this Court
regarded as sufficient notice of the impending action/substance of the proposed amendment: 1)
Serving the non-party with a copy of the motion for leave to amend along with the proposed
amended complaint; or 2) Serving the non-party with a copy of the motion for leave to amend
which fully and comprehensively lays out the substance of the proposed amendment. TerraWest, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393. 399-400, 247 P.3d 620, 626-627 (2010).

Applying Idaho case law precedent to this case there is no question that EIRMC is

7
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situated exactly like the third party in the Griggs case; consequently the rationale and notice
concerns of Griggs apply to this case. EIRMC was not a pany when this case was in federal
court and when Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Leave to File Second .A.mended Complaint
(attempting to add new causes of action and new parties, including EIRMC). EIRMC was never
served with the Motion for Leave to File Second i\mended Complaint (which included the
proposed Second Amended Complaint).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor was not commenced until
the actual filing of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on January 16, 2014, which was
twenty-eight (28) days after the applicable statute of limitations had run on December 19, 2013.
Thus, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint against EIRMC is barred by Idaho Code§ 5219(4) as extended by the tolling provisions ofidaho Code§ 6-1005. EIRMC was appropriately
granted summary jud!:,JJTient.
Plaintiffs' contention that federal rules of civil procedure and federal law govern when
their state law cause of action against EIRMC commenced for purposes of Idaho statute of
limitations in this state court action is without merit. It is repugnant to the notions of fair play
and due process to propose that a federal rule of civil procedure and the federal case law
interpreting such a rule could apply to an Idaho state court case (the only case EIRMC has ever
been a part of). supersede Idaho law, and enlarge/modify a party's exposure to liability that it
would not otherwise have under Idaho state law.
Nevertheless, even if federal law is examined it is clear that such law mandates that Idaho
law controls this matter. The question at issue in this matter is: \Vhen was Plaintiffs' medical

8
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negligence action commenced against EIRMC for purposes of Idaho's statute
Obviously, Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 and 15 do not answer this question because such a question can only
be answered by Idaho state law. Accordingly, pursuant to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S.
64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938) and its progeny, statutes oflimitations are substantive
for Erie purposes and thus state law (statutes and case law) determines when an action
commences for statute of limitation purposes. Further. any reliance by Plaintiffs upon the ex
parte order they received from the federal court is unfounded because the order is void, resulting
from the federal court's lack of jurisdiction at the time when Plaintiffs filed their motion and
when the order was entered. Therefore. this Court's decision in Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,
775 P.2d 120 (1989) is the controlling law that defines when Plaintiffs' action was commenced
against EIRMC for statute of limitations purposes, and pursuant to Griggs, Plaintiffs' action was
not commenced until after the statute oflimitations had expired. Accordingly, EIRMC
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's Opinion and Order Granting
Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Opinion and Order Denying
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.
B. Idaho case law precedent requires affirmance of the district court's Opinion and
Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment because
such precedent holds that Plaintiffs' claims against EIRMC did not commence until
the filing of the Second Amended Complaint on January 16, 2014, which was
twenty-eight (28) days after the statute of limitations had expired.
l. Griggs v. Nash requires dismissal of Plaintiffs' action against EIRMC.

In Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989), two defendants moved for leave
of the district court to file a third-party complaint against an attorney for legal malpractice. Id. at

9
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775 P.2d at 126.

copy of the proposed third-party complaint was attached to the motion.

Id. The motion for leave was made within the two-year statute oflimitations, but the district
court did not rule on the motion until eight (8) months later and the third-party complaint was
filed at least fourteen (14) days after the two-year statute oflimitations had expired. Id. Faced
with the foregoing facts, this Court stated: "The primary issue presented is whether the two-year
statute oflimitations contained in LC.§ 5-219(4) had run before the action against the
attorney was commenced." Id. at 229, 77 5 P .2d at 121.

Answering that primary issue, this Court concluded:
Therefore, we conclude that the action of EMSI and Van Gelder against Trout for
malpractice accrued by at least September 9, 1985. To avoid being barred by LC.
§ 5-219(4 ), an action by EMSI and Van Gelder for professional malpractice based
on Trout's alleged failure to inform them of the value of the property must have
been commenced by September 9, 1987.
On January 29, 1987, EMSI and Van Gelder filed a motion pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 14(a) for leave to file a third-party complaint against Trout. A
copy of the third-party complaint was attached to the motion. On September
8, 1987, the trial court signed an order granting EMSI and Van Gelder leave to
file their third-party complaint. The order was filed on September 10, 1987. The
third-party complaint was filed on September 23, 1987. Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
3(a), an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint. Therefore, the
action contained in the third-party complaint was not commenced until
September 23, 1987. This was at least 14 days after the two-year statute of
limitations had run. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the
third-party complaint was barred by I.C. § 5-219(4).

Id. at 234, 775 P.2d at 126 (emphasis added).
In Griggs, there is no question that the motion. along with a copy of the proposed
complaint, was filed long before the statute oflimitations had run yet this Court properly ruled
that the claim against Trout for professional negligence was not commenced until it was actually
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as required by LR.C.P. 3(a). This Court was squarely presented with, analyzed, and issued
a decision on the question of whether a motion for leave to add a new party to a lawsuit
commences with the filing of the motion for leave or with the actual filing of the complaint for
purposes of the statute oflimitations. This Court held that that in such a situation a lawsuit
commences with the actual filing of the complaint for statute of limitations purposes.
The present matter fits squarely within the Griggs case. There is no dispute that
Plaintiffs' action against EIRMC accrued on September 17, 2011. Applying LC. § 6-1005 and
Idaho case law precedent interpreting such statute, any action against EIRMC by Plaintiffs must
have been commenced by December 19, 2013. On December 10, 2013, Plaintiffs filed in federal
court a motion for leave to amend their complaint to add new parties (EIRMC and Dr. Taylor)
and new causes of action (medical malpractice) to their complaint and attached a copy of their
proposed amended complaint. The order granting the motion to amend was filed on January 16,
2014 and Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint was also filed on January 16, 2014. Pursuant
to l.R.C.P. 3(a) and Griggs Plaintiffs' action against EIRMC was not commenced until the actual
filing of the Second Amended Complaint on January 16, 2014. 1 This is at least twenty-eight (28)

1

See also Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 795, 41 P.3d 220,223 (2001) (emphasis
added) ("A civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court . .. ");
Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890,895,277 P.3d 337,342 (2012) (emphasis added) ("iJ.though
this Court has not specifically addressed the issue, the Court of Appeals has held that service
and filing of a motion for leave to file a counterclaim, even where the proposed
counterclaim is attached, is not the equivalent of service and filing of the counterclaim
itself."); Denton v. Detweiler, 48 Idaho 369,373,282 P. 82, 83 (1929) (emphasis added) ("While
an amendment setting up no new cause of action or claim, and making no new demand, related
back to the filing of the original complaint, and the running of the statute oflimitations is
arrested at that point, if the amendment introduces a new or different cause of action and
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days after the applicable statute oflimitations had run. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' action against
EIRMC is barred by LC.§ 5-219(4) and EIRMC was properly granted summary judgment in this
matter.
2. Terra-West. Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust. LLC did not overturn or i::lf!rify GrigzS' and
this Court's reasoning in Terra-West supports the dismissal of EIRMC in this matter.
The dispute in Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,247 P.3d 620
(2010) did not involve the addition of new parties to a lawsuit. Instead, the plaintiff in TerraWest, Inc. filed a motion to amend its complaint to foreclose on a second mechanic's lien against

the defendant, who was already a party to the lawsuit by way of the original complaint. Id. at
394-395, 247 P.3d at 621-622. This Court held that because the defendant in Terra-West, Inc.
was already part of the lawsuit and was served with the motion for leave to amend as well as the
proposed amended complaint it had notice of the commencement of the foreclosure action within
the statutory time period. Id. at 399, 24 7 P .3d at 626. Thus, this case is distinguishable because
EIRMC was not named in the original complaint or even the first amended complaint and no
claims for medical negligence were made in Plaintiffs' original or first amended complaint. In
addition, unlike the defendant in Terra-West, Inc. EIRMC was not served and did not receive a
copy of Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend or the proposed second amended complaint before
the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the holding of Terra-West has no
applicability to this matter.
However, this Court's reasoning in Terra-West, Inc. and discussion of Griggs supports
makes a new or different demand, the statute continues to run until the amendment is
filed.").
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grant of summary judgment in favor ofEIRMC in this matter:

... our decision in Griggs is distinguishable from the case at bar because it
concerned the timeliness of a third-party complaint, which is categorically
different than a motion to amend to add a new claim against a party who is
already part of the action. In the context of a third-party complaint, there may
be good reason to prefer the more cumbersome method of requiring the filing of
an independent action against the third party to commence the proceedings.
Under I.R.C.P. 14(a), a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, even if the
proposed complaint is attached to the motion, does not give any notice to the third
party that it may be subject to an impending action. Because the third party
would not be served with the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint,
the third party may discover, after the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations, that a previously filed motion to which the third party had no
notice, commenced the proceedings. Such a rule is contrary to the purposes
of any statute of limitations, which functions to prevent stale claims and to
protect a defendant's reasonable expectation that his earlier conduct can no
longer give rise to liability. See Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 501, 788 P.2d
1321, 1324 (1990). However, the same rationale does not apply in this case. As
mentioned above, Idaho Mutual was served with the motion for leave to amend,
as well as the proposed amended complaint. Idaho Mutual, unlike a party that has
not yet been joined, had notice of the substance of the proposed amendment
before the six-month period expired under Idaho Code section 45-510.
Consequently, Griggs is distinguishable because this case does not present the
same notice concern.
Id. at 399-400, 247 P.3d at 626-627 (emphasis added).
EIRMC's position in this matter is identical to the position of the proposed third party
(Trout) in the Griggs case. There is no distinction between filing a motion for leave to file a
third-party complaint and a motion for leave to file an amended complaint designed only to add
new claims against new parties. Plaintiffs did not provide any notice to EIRMC of the motion to
amend or the proposed second amended complaint. It is undisputed that EIRMC was not served
with the motion to amend or the proposed second amended complaint. Thus, unlike the
defendant in Terra-West, EIRMC did not have notice of the substance of the proposed
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amendment before the applicable statute oflimitations expired. Consequently, the rationale and
notice concerns of Griggs apply to this case.
In addition, as noted by this Court in Terra-West, allowing a previously filed motion to
which a third party had no notice commence an action is contrary to the very purpose of the
statute oflimitations. Important purposes are served by statute oflimitations. "The policy
behind statutes of limitation is protection of defendants against stale claims, and protection of the
courts against needless expenditure ofresources." Higginson v. Wadsworth, 128 Idaho 439, 442,
915 P.2d 1, 4 (1996) (quoting Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397,402, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985)).
"Statutes oflimitation are designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to
future litigation." Id.

If Plaintiffs arguments were accepted in this case the statute of limitations would
effectively be extended by judicial decree in excess of the time established by the legislature by
virtue of LC.§ 5-219(4) and LC.§ 6-1005. Not only would this prevent EIRMC from receiving
prompt notice of the claim as intended by the statute, it would also prevent the finality and
stability which the statute of limitations was designed by our legislature to achieve. Pursuant to
Idaho law, the action against EIRMC was commenced, as required by Idaho Code§ 5-219(4)
and I.R.C.P. 3(a), when the Second Amended Complaint was actually filed with the federal court
on January 16, 2014. Thus, Plaintiffs' medical negligence action against EIRMC was
commenced twenty-eight (28) days after the statute of limitations had expired on any claims
against EIRMC. Accordingly, EIRMC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district
court's Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.
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"
.).

Proper notice was not given in this case and therefore the district court's Opinion
and Order Grantirnz EIRMC's and Dr. Tavlor's Motions for Surnmarv Judgment
should be affirmed.

In Terra-West, this Court analyzed the issue of notice. This Court stated:
An important part of the analysis in many of the cases discussed above
involves whether the defendant had notice of the substance of the proposed
amendment prior to expiration of the statutory time period either because the
plaintiff had attached the amended complaint to the motion for leave to
amend, QI because the text of the motion itself detailed the substance of the
proposed amendment.

Terra-West, Inc., 150 Idaho at 399,247 P.3d at 626 (emphasis added).
As an example, this Court noted that in Rademaker v. E.D. Flynn Expert Co., 17 F.2d 15,
17 (5th Cir. 1927) "central to the court's analysis was the defendant had been served with the

motion prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the motion 'fully and
comprehensively' laid out the substance of the proposed amendment." Id. (Emphasis added).
Similarly, in Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2002), a case cited to in Terra-West,

Inc. and cited to multiple times in Plaintiffs' appellate brief, the party to be added to the amended
complaint "was served with the motion to amend, and was informed that it had been filed

with the court, prior to the expiration of the statute of repose." Id. at 138 ( emphasis added).
In fact. as the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted: "Local rule 15.l(b) requires that the

motion to amend be served on the proposed defendant prior to filing of the motion, a rule
that guarantees service on the defendant prior to the expiration of the statute of repose."
Id. (Emphasis added).
This Comi in Terra-West then went on to state:
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In this case, because Idaho Mutual was not dismissed from the case following
the invalidation of the first lien, the motion for leave to file the amended
complaint gave notice to Idaho Mutual within the six-month jurisdictional
time limit that Terra-West was seeking to foreclose the second lien. Terra-West
served Idaho Mutual with the motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 5(a), which requires a
party filing a motion for leave to amend to serve the written motion on each party
to the case affected by the motion. Idaho R. Civ. P. 5(a). Furthermore, the
proposed amended complaint was attached to the motion for leave to amend,
which further demonstrates that Idaho Mutual had notice of the commencement of
the foreclosure action within the six-month time limitation.

Terra-West, Inc., 150 Idaho at 399,247 P.3d at 626 (emphasis added).

It is undisputed in this case that while Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the first
amended complaint was filed on December 10, 2013, Plaintiffs never served EIRMC with a copy
of the motion or the proposed second amended complaint. Thus, unlike the defendant in Terra-

West and the defendants in Rademaker and Nett, EIRMC never received notice of the
commencement of the action against it within the appropriate statute of limitations. This fact
alone is sufficient to affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of EIRMC.
Without citing to any Idaho authority and overlooking the significant and exclusive
language contained in Terra-West cited above, Plaintiffs contend that they gave sufficient notice
to EIRMC by way of discussions and the prelitigation screening procedure. In support of such a
proposition Plaintiffs cite to four (4) cases. Since it is Idaho state law (Griggs and Terra-West)
which controls the issue before this Court, the decisions cited by Plaintiffs that were rendered in
the context of federal question cases and utilized federal law can be distinguished on that basis
alone. See Rademaker 1 E.D. Fzvnn Export Co., 17 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1927) (federal question
1
•

under Merchant Marine Act of 1920 where the defendant was served with the motion prior to the
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'fully and comprehensively' laid out

expiration of the statute oflimitations, and the
substance of the proposed amendment):

v. AT&T Informarion S:vs .. Inc ..

F.2d 1172

(8th Cir. 1989) (action brought pursuant to 29 U .S.C. § l 60(b )): and Moore v. State, 999 F.2d
1125 (7th Cir. 1993) (action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Longo v. Pennsylvania

Electric Co .. 618 F. Supp. 87 (W.D. Pa. 1985) is distinguishable because it was wrongly decided
and should have applied Pennsylvania law. which like Idaho law, is that an action is commenced
only by filing a complaint, not by filing a motion for leave to amend.

2

Clearly, this Court has decided that in a situation where an amendment is adding new
parties to a lawsuit more is required than a simple telephone call or letter:

. . . In the context of a third-party complaint, there may be good reason to prefer
the more cumbersome method of requiring the filing of an independent action
against the third party to commence the proceedings. Under I.R.C.P. 14(a), a
motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, even if the proposed complaint is
attached to the motion, does not give any notice to the third party that it may be
subject to an impending action. Because the third party would not be served with
the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, the third party may discover,
after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, that a previously filed
motion to which the third party had no notice, commenced the proceedings.
Terra-West, Inc., 150 Idaho at 399-400, 24 7 P .3d at 626-627.
Allowing a party to provide notice to a non-party by a simple telephone call or letter

:i See Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595. 598 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("Plaintiffs
nevertheless urge this court to adopt a new rule declaring that statutes of limitations are tolled by
the filing of a petition for leave to amend in the trial court. We decline plaintiffs' offer.'' ... " ..
. we hold, consistent with prior appellate court decisions, that an action is commenced only by
filing with the prothonotary a praecipe for writ of summons. a complaint, or an agreement for an
amicable action."); Schach v. Ford Motor Co., 210 F.R.D. 522, 523 (M.D. Pa. 2002)
("Pennsylvania case law makes clear that filing of a motion for leave to amend does not toll the
statute of limitations.")
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would create a nightmare in attempting to determine whether or not actual notice was received
by

new party prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

acknowled2:ed bv., this
~

Court in Griggs and Terra-West, Inc .. the better rule is to require the filing of an independent
action before the statute oflimitations expires. Then, there is no question that the action is
timely and the court system is spared from vague and ambiguous arguments about whether a
party received or did not receive adequate notice. This is also consistent with this Court's
rationale and decision in Terra-West, Inc. that a party to ar1 action receives notice of the
substance of a new claim against that party when the party is served with a copy of the motion
and proposed amended complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Terra-

West, Inc., 150 Idaho at 399,247 P.3d at 626.
Additionally, even if a telephone call or letter could be considered notice (which it cannot
as discussed above) Plaintiffs' discussions with counsel for EIRMC never involved notice of the
commencement of a lawsuit or the substance of the claims against EIRMC. In fact, the
conversations between Plaintiffs' counsel and counsel of EIRMC consisted of Plaintiffs' counsel
assuring counsel for EIRMC that Plaintiffs were not going to initiate a lawsuit against EIRMC.
R. Vol. 1, p. 140-141, 144. The only correspondence received from Plaintiffs' counsel merely
stated that Plaintiffs would pursue their claims wherever they might lead, it was possible the
Cook defendants will try to blame Dr. Taylor and the hospitaL that it would be up to the Cook
defendants as to whether it really wanted to implicate either Dr. Taylor or the hospital, and that
Plaintiffs would have no reason to implicate Dr. Taylor and the hospital unless the Cook
defendants pushed things in that direction. R. Vol. 1. p. 141. There was nothing in the

18
42657.0009.7767221. l

correspondence regarding the filing of a lawsuit against

Plaintiffs or the substance of

any claims by Plaintiff against EIRMC. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claim that notice was provided
through discussions with counsel for EIRMC is without merit.
Plaintiffs attempt to equate the filing of a prelitigation screening panel request with actual
notice that a lawsuit has been filed against EIRMC is equally without merit. The prelitigation
screening procedure was designed specifically for the purpose of encouraging consideration of
claims informally and without the necessity of litigation. Idaho Code § 6-1005. 3 The process,
which is entirely overseen by the Idaho State Board of Medicine, was never designed for the
purpose of giving notice to a party of the commencement of a medical negligence action. It was
designed to avoid litigation. Sec Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420,425,
942 P .2d 544, 549 (1997) ("The legislature therefore declared that it is in the public interest to
encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims against physicians and hospitals by providing for
prelitigation screening of such claims.") Indeed, if the filing of a prelitigation screening
application was sufficient notice of the commencement of an action or even sufficient notice of
the substance of an action there would be no need to toll the statute of limitations during the
process and for thirty (30) days thereafter, which is how the process works.
Further, very little information was provided by Plaintiffs to EIRMC and Dr. Taylor

"Prelitigation screening panel proceedings are not a civil lawsuit, nor are they an adjunct to a
civil lawsuit. They are entirely separate proceedings. The prelitigiation screening panel
proceedings are informal and nonbinding, the rules of evidence do not apply, no record is kept,
there is no cross-examination or rebuttal, the proceedings are closed even to the parties except
when they are presenting their own testimony and argument ... " Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho
526, 531, 66 P .3d 230, 235 (2003).
3
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through the prelitigation process. Plaintiffs prelitigation screening application in this case was
very va6rue and consisted of a mere thirty-seven

7) words. Also, numerous prelitigation

screening panels are filed and hearings completed which never result in formal litigation. Thus,
the filing of a prelitigation screening panel request does not equate to the filing of a lawsuit
against a party or even give a potential party notice that a lawsuit will be commenced within the
statutory time. This is similar to the situation in Ketterling,,. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555,
558,272 P.3d 527, 530 (2012) wherein this Court stated that even if the manager and insurance
agent of a restaurant had notice of an injury "that would not be sufficient to impart 'notice of the
institution of the action"' as required by LR.C.P. 15. This Court went on to state" ... notice of
an injury within the limitations period is not the same as notice of the filing of the lawsuit within
the limitations period." Id. (citing Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 730, 184 P.3d 852, 855
(2008)). "Whether HB Boys had notice of potential litigation, or whether it would be prejudiced
in defending against any action, is not the relevant inquiry." Id.
Accordingly, a prelitigation screening panel request does not equate to the filing of a
lawsuit against a party nor does it give a potential party sufficient notice that a lawsuit will be
commenced within the applicable statute oflimitations. Thus, there is no dispute that EIRMC
had no notice of a lawsuit being filed against it until February 3. 2013; forty-six (46) days after
the statute oflimitations had run. Consequently. the situation present in this case places EIRMC
exactly in the same position as the third-party defendant in Griggs and requires dismissal of
EIRMC from this action. Therefore, EIRMC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court's Opinion and Order Granting EIRMC's and Dr. Taylor's Motions for Summary
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Judgment.
C. It defies logic that a federal rule or federal law could govern EIRMC in this matter

where the federal court never had jurisdiction over EIRMC.
EIRMC was never part of the federal la\vsuit and the federal court never had jurisdiction
over EIRMC in said lawsuit. Plaintiffs admit that once they filed their Second Amended
Complaint on January 16, 2014, the federal court was deprived of subject matter jurisdici:ion. R.
Vol. 1, p. 52. The federal court agreed that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. R. Vol. 2, p.
291. When service of process was effected on EIRMC it was with a state court summons. Thus,

the federal court never had personal jurisdiction over EIRMC because "service of process is the
due process procedure that vests a court with jurisdiction over a person ... " McGloon v. Gwynn,
140 Idaho 727, 730, 100 P.3d 621,624 (2004). Accordingly, it is illogical that a federal rule or
federal law could affect EIRMC's substantive rights in this state court lawsuit and1or supersede
Idaho law when the federal court never had subject matter over the claim involving EIRMC and
never had personal jurisdiction over EIRMC.
D. Federal case law is clear that in a diversity action the question of when an action
commences for statute of limitations purposes is a substantive question governed by
state law, therefore Idaho state law governs this matter.

The determinative issue/question in this case is: when was Plaintiffs' medical negligence
action commenced against EIRMC for purposes ofldaho's statute oflimitations? Contrary to
Plaintiffs' sophistry, this question cannot be answered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
whether it is Rule 3 or Rule 15. The United State Supreme Court has held that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not answer the question of when a cause of action derived from state law
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commences for purposes of the state's statute of limitations: "In our

in diversity actions

[Federal] Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules
begin to run, but does not affect state statutes oflimitations." Walker v. Armco Steel Cmp., 446
U.S. 740, 751, 100 S. Ct. 1978, 64 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1980). In a concurring opinion, Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Chief Judge (at the time) Kozinkski concisely summarized Walker:
Confronted with a state substantive rule (the statute of limitations) and a federal
procedural rule fixing the date when a civil action commences, the Court held
that there was no conflict because the two rules dealt with different
questions. Id. at 750-51, 100 S. Ct. 1978. The federal rule, the Court noted,
set the date for the commencement of the action for the purpose of
measuring various time periods internal to the lawsuit. Id. at 751, 100 S. Ct.
1978. The rule wasn't meant to affect the time when the statute of limitations
was tolled by commencement of the lawsuit. Id. at 751-53, 100 S. Ct. 1978.
The latter was a matter of state substantive law. Because the federal
procedural rule and the state substantive rule could co-exist peaceably within their
respective spheres, the Court concluded that each could be given full effect: The
state rule would perform the backwards-looking function of determining
whether the action was brought within the statute of limitations, whereas the
federal rule would determine when the action began for the forward-looking
purpose of measuring time periods applicable to the litigation. Id. at 750-53,
100 S. Ct. 1978.

. . . a broad reading of the federal procedural rule could impinge on the
substantive state law right by extending the statute of limitations. This
would have led to the "'inequitable administration' of the law" by giving
these plaintiffs greater rights than they would have enjoyed in state court,
"solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citizenship between the
litigants." Id. at 753. 100 S. Ct. 1978 (internal citation omitted).
Makaeffv. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 272-73 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
( emphasis added).
Likewise, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not answer the question
of when a claim arising out of Idaho state law is commenced for purposes of Idaho's statute of

22
42657 0009.7767221.1

limitations. In fact, Plaintiffs never made

argument at the district court level that Fed. R.

15 was somehow controlling or determinative in this matter; Plaintiffs focused exclusively on
Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. This appeal is the first time Plaintiffs have made such an argument regarding
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. This Court has repeatedly held that it "will not consider issues that are raised
for the first time on appeal." Bell v. Idaho Dept. o_fLabor, 157 Idaho 744,749,339 P.3d 1148,
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Accordingly, Plaintiffs reliance on Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) and Shady Grove

Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) and attempt to avoid the
Erie doctrine in this case is misplaced and without merit because the issue or question in dispute
in this matter is obviously not answered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is beyond dispute that when a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction the forum

state's substantive law applies and controls. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct.
817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (193 8). Statutes oflimitations are substantive for Erie purposes. Guar.

Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-110, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945). It is well
established that in diversity cases state law governs not only the limitations period but also the
commencement of the limitations period. Ragan v. Merchs. Trans.fer & Warehouse Co., 337
U.S. 530,533, 69 S. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109110, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 ( 1945). The Idaho Supreme Court is controlling authority on
questions ofidaho law. Commissioner v. Bosch. 387 U.S. 456,465, 87 S. Ct. 1776, 18 L. Ed. 2d
886 (1967). Thus, there is no question that Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989)
is the substantive law that applies, controls, and dictates the outcome of this matter.
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The United States Supreme Court case of Walker v. Armco Steel Cmp., 446 U.S.
100 S. Ct. 1978, 64 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1980) is on point in this matter and Plaintiffs' attempt to
distinguish it is without merit. In Walker. the U.S. Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue
of "whether in a diversity action the federal court should follow state law or, alternatively. Rule 3
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in detem1ining when an action is commenced for
purposes of tolling the state statute of limitations." Id. at 741. In said case the U.S. Supreme
Comi noted that it had already established in earlier precedent that "' [except} in matters

governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
[diversity] case is the law of the state."' Id. at 745 ( emphasis added).
The U.S. Supreme Court went on to state in Walker:
In construing Erie we noted that "[in] essence, the intent of that decision was to
insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the
litigation in federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rule
determine the outcome of the litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court." (Citation omitted). We concluded that the state statute of limitations
should be applied. "Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery
in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not
merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect
recovery or on-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State
law."

Id. at 745.
Finally. the Walker Court held: "In our view, in diversity actions Rule 3 governs the date
from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not affect
state statutes oflimitations." Id. at 751.
The present matter involves an alleged right to recover derived from the State ofldaho
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not

United States. Accordingly, the Erie doctrine applies and Idaho

interpreting when a

lawsuit commences for statute of limitations purposes governs the issue of when Plaintiffs' state
law action commenced. As set forth above, in diversity cases the outcome of the litigation in
federal court should be substantially the same as it would be if tried in a State court. Plaintiffs
are arguing the exact opposite. Plaintiffs contend that this Court should follow federal law and
by doing so come to a result that would be completely contrary to the outcome mandated by
Idaho state law. The policies for diversity jurisdiction do not support such a distinction betvveen
state and federal plaintiffs and Erie and the multitude of cases that follow Erie do not permit
such an interpretation, Accordingly, Idaho state law, specifically Griggs, is determinative of the
outcome in this matter.
A host of federal law and secondary material is in af::,rreement. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has held:

As all parties acknowledge, it is well established that in diversity cases state
law governs not only the limitations period but also the commencement of the
limitations period. See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co .. 337 U.S.
530,533.69 S. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949); sec also Guar. Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109-10, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945). The district court
appears to have followed the rule for § 1983 actions, in which a state limitations
period is borrowed but federal law governs when that state limitations period
begins to run. (internal citations omitted). It is appropriate to use federal rules to
determine when the limitations period begins to run for a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 because the cause of action is created by federal law. When federal

jurisdiction is based on diversity, as it is in this case, however, state
substantive law must govern. See Guar. Trust, 326 U.S. at 109-11 O: Erie R.R. ,·.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). A state's
rules providing for the start and length of the statute of limitations is
substantive law. See e.g., Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231,235 (8th Cir.),
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521 U.S.179, 117 S. Ct. 1984, 138
2d373 (1997);
Monsanto Co., 955 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992).

Power Co. v.

Cantor Fitzgerald v. Lutnick, 313 F.3d 704, 709-10 (2002) (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has heid that the federal civil rule governing
commencement of an action (Fed. R. Civ. P. 3) "does not commence a suit based on state law

for purposes of the statute of limitations ... [but] does commence a suit based on federal law
that has a statute of limitations borrowed from federal law." Sain v. City o.fBend, 309 F.3d 1134,
1138 (9 111 Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). See also Tornabene v. Marcial, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14198, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Marcial correctly asserts that, for statute of limitations

purposes, the time at which a diversity action is commenced depends on the laws of the
state whose substantive law governs the controversy.'' (citations omitted) (emphasis added));

Durrett v. Leading Edge Prods., 965 F. Supp. 280,286 (D. Conn. 1997) ("As this is a diversity
action arising under Connecticut law, Connecticut state law governs the manner in which
the action is to be considered commenced for purposes of the state statute of limitations."
(citation omitted) (emphasis added); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Po~vvision Corp., 390 F. Supp. 2d 269,

272 (E.D .N. Y. 2005) ("In this diversity case, it is the law of the State of New York that
governs the time in which the action must be commenced as well as any applicable toll."
(citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
Wright and Miller's authoritative treatise on federal procedure concisely states the
applicable rule:
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In federal actions based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, federal courts
apply state lav,' to decide when a lawsuit \Vas commenced for certain purposes,
such as computing limitations periods.
4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1052 (3d ed. 1998

& Supp. 2006).
Interestingly, the case Plaintiffs cite to in their opening brief as standing for the
proposition that federal procedurai law is clear that an amended complaint is deemed filed as of
the date the motion to amend is filed actually holds:
The Court concludes that the issue of when this action commenced as a class
action for purposes of removal under CAF A is governed by state law, not
federal law. As the Schillinger court regognized, "in cases for which state law
provides the rule of decision, federal courts apply state statute of limitations,
including qualifications on those statutes." 425 F.3d at 334. Cf Pace v.
DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,415, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 161 L. Ed. 2d 669 (2005)
(looking to state law to determine when a pleading has been "properly filed" for
purposes of a federal statute oflimitations); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 751, 100 S. Ct. 1978, 64 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1980) (state law determines
when an action commences for statute of limitations purposes) ...
"In federal actions based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, federal courts
apply state law to decide when a lawsuit was commenced for certain purposes,
such as computing limitations periods. (internal citation omitted). This rule is
based on the familiar principles enunciated in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompldns, 304
U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), that federal courts lack
constitutional power to fashion broad swathes of federal common law and that,
when a federal court sitting in diversity acts in effect as a state court, its
application of state law should be controlled by authoritative interpretations of
that law by the highest court of that state. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 744-45, 100 S.
Ct. 1978. Sec also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir.
1995).

Buller Trucldng Co. v. Owner Operator lndep. Driver Risk Retention Group., 461 F. Supp. 2d
768. 775 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (emphasis added).
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Thus, under the facts of this case this Court's holding

Griggs v. Nash, 116 ldaho 228,

77 5 P .2d 120 ( 1989) is controlling and determines when the action in this matter was
"commenced" against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor for statute

limitations purposes. As determined

by the district court in its Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for
Summary Judgment, Idaho law dictates that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a Second
Amended Complaint did not commence the action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor; it was not
until the actual filing of the second amended complaint that the action was commenced.
Consequently, Plaintiffs did not commence the action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor until after
the statute oflimitations had expired. Morever, even construing Terra-West, Inc. as a
modification of the holding in Griggs, Plaintiffs failed to provide notice of the impending
action/substance of the amendment in either of the two exclusive ways provided for by this Court
in Terra-West, Inc. Accordingly. Plaintiffs' claims against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor are barred by
the statute of limitations. Therefore, the district court's decisions granting summary judgment
for EIRMC and Dr. Taylor and denying Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration should be
affirmed.
E. The April 9, 2014 ex parte Order obtained by Plaintiffs in federal court is void and
has no value or applicability to this matter because the federal court was without
jurisdiction.
On March 4, 2014 (after the federal court remanded this case back to state court, was
divested of jurisdiction, and after EIRMC had been served with the Second Amended Complaint)
Plaintiffs filed a Rule 60 Motion to Clarify Docket Entry Order in federal court. R. Vol. 2, pp.
283-284. Because EIRMC was never a party to the federal court proceedings and because copies
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Clarify were never served upon

Plaintiffs' Motion to

was unopposed. Interestingly, Plaintiffs must have realized that they had a problem with the
statute oflimitations with regard to EIRMC and Dr. Taylor because they filed their motion with
the federal court before EIR1v1C or Dr. Taylor had even moved for summary jud6TJTient on the
issue. The federal court entered an order on the Motion to Clarify on April 9, 2014. R. Vol. 2, p.
240.

"Once a district court certifies a remand order to state court it is divested of
jurisdiction and can take no further action on the case." Seedman v. Unired States District
Court, 837 F.2d 413,414 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). "It is clear that a remand order ends
the federal court's jurisdiction." Pelleport Investors, Inc. r. Budco Quali(F Theatres, Inc., 741
F.2d 273,279 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 747, 66 S. Ct. 835,
83 7, 90 L. Ed. 982 (1946). See also In re Lowe, l 02 F .3d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1996)
("Accordingly, we hold that a federal court loses jurisdiction over a case as soon as its order to
remand the case is entered."); Brier~v v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc .. 184 F.3d 527,531
111

(6 Cir. 1999) (" ... a remand to state court divests a district court of jurisdiction such it may not
take any further action on the case."); Federal Deposit Insurance Cmp. v. Santiago Plaza, 598
F.2d 634, 636 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[ o ]nee a district court has decided to remand a case and has so
notified the state court, the district judge is without power to take any further action."): New

England Technology Finance, LLC v. Ente1prise Resource Procurement. LLC 2008 WL
2688099, *2 (D. Arizona 2008) ("'[I]t is clear that an order ofremand to state court ends the
jurisdiction of the federal court over the case."') (Citing Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
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Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 379 at 491.) "'Without jurisdiction the court

cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law, and when it
ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause."' Steel Compan.v v. Citizens.for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94,

118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012, 140 L.Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514,
19 L. Ed. 264 (1868)).
Accordingly, because the federal court was without jurisdiction when Plaintiffs filed their
Rule 60 Motion and when it entered its April 9, 2014 Order, the jud&went is void and has no
value or applicability to this matter. 4
F. This Court should not overturn the holdings of Griggs v. Nash and Terra-West, Inc.

v. Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC as urged by Plaintiffs; this case is a matter of Plaintiffs
failing to follow established Idaho law.
The last ten (10) pages of Plaintiffs' opening appellate brief is dedicated to urging this
Court to overturn its decisions in Griggs v. Nash, l 16 ldaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989) and TerrafVcst, Inc. v. Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393 (2010). However, the statute of

limitations problem was self-created and self-inflicted by Plaintiffs failure to follow Idaho law.

Plaintiffs knew about the order for almost two weeks before filing their response to Dr. Taylor's
motion for summary judgment but failed to raise any arguments regarding the order at that time.
Plaintiffs should now be precluded from raising arguments based on evidence which was
available to Plaintiffs at the time of their initial response but which they intentionally chose not
to raise for whatever strategic purpose. See e.g. Campbell v. Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692, 696, 316
P.3d 104, 108 (2013) (reciting district court's rationale for denying Campbell's Motion for
Reconsideration).
4
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1. Plaintiffs' statute of limitations problem was self-inflicted bv failing to read.
understand. and/or follow Idaho law.
The only reason this matter ever ended up in federal court in the first place was because
of Plaintiffs failure to follow Idaho law. It has been clear in Idaho since 1988 that "a party
allegedly harmed by medical malpractice could commence a civil lawsuit before filing a request
for a prelitigation screening panel. Idaho Code § 6-1001 does not mandate the dismissal of a
medical malpractice lawsuit because it is filed before the commencement of the prelitigation
screening proceedings." Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 530, 66 P .3d 230, 234 (2003) ( citing

Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 765 P.2d 676 (1988)).
Pursuant to Idaho law, Plaintiffs could/should have filed the present suit against the Cook
Defendants, Dr. Taylor, and EIRMC at the same time in state court (September 2013) and then
had several options. One option was to serve process upon all parties and then enter into a
stipulation or move the district court for an order staying the entire litigation until the
prelitigation proceedings involving EIRMC and Dr. Taylor had concluded. Another option was
to serve process upon all parties and then enter into a stipulation or move the district court for an
order staying the litigation with respect to EIRMC and Dr. Taylor until the prelitigation
proceedings concluded while proceeding with the litigation against the Cook Defendants.
Another option was to simply wait until the prelitigation proceedings involving EIRMC and Dr.
Taylor had concluded and then serve process upon all parties. Yet another option was for
Plaintiffs to serve process upon the Cook Defendants and then wait to serve process upon
EIRMC and Dr. Taylor until the conclusion of the prelitigation proceedings.
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Any one of the foregoing actions on the part of Plaintiffs would have avoided the Cook
Defendants removing the action to federal court. Any one of these actions on the part of
Plaintiffs would have avoided Plaintiffs having to seek leave of the court to amend their
complaint to add Dr. Taylor and EIRMC as defendants and add new causes of action. In
addition to the foregoing actions, Plaintiffs could have moved the state court to amend the
complaint to add Dr. Taylor and EIRMC as defendants when the Cook Defendants moved for
removal of the action to federal court in October of 2013. Plaintiffs could have also filed a
separate state court action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor and then moved to consolidate said
action with the action against the Cook Defendants when they attempted to remove the same.
Finally, Plaintiffs could have moved to amend their complaint much earlier than they did to
avoid any statute of limitations problems: however, they failed to do so.
Thus, to avoid problems like the ones Plaintiffs created and inflicted upon themselves in
this matter one must only follow well-established Idaho law and take one of the many paths
outlined above. Therefore, Plaintiffs request to overturn Idaho case law precedent as a way to
remedy problems that they created for themselves should not be permitted. Consequently,
EIRMC would request that this Court decline Plaintiffs' invitation to overturn Idaho case law
precedent.
2. The rule proposed bv Plaintiffs is the exact opposite of this Court's holding in Griggs
v. Nash and this Court has alreadv stated in Terra-West. Inc. that the rule proposed by
Plaintiffs is contrarv to the purposes of anv statute oflimitations and therefore should
be rejected.
The rule proposed by Plaintiffs is contrary to this Court's holding in Griggs v. Nash, 116
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Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989) and is contrary to this Court's

FVcst, Inc. v.

Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393 (2010). In Griggs, two defendants moved for leave
the court to file a third party complaint. Id. at 234, 775 P.2d at 126. The motion for leave was
made within the applicable statute of limitations, however the district court did not rule on the
motion until months later and the actual third party complaint was not filed until after the
applicable statute of limitations had expired. Id. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 3(a) this Court held that
the action was not conm1enced until the third-party complaint was actually filed with the court
and consequently it was barred by the statute of limitations. Id.
In Terra-West, Inc., this Court set forth its reasoning for requiring notice to a proposed
new defendant of an impending action within the statute of limitations:
However, our decision in Griggs is distinguishable from the case at bar because it
concerned the timeliness of a third-party complaint, which is categorically
different than a motion to amend to add a new claim against a party who is
already part of the action. In the context of a third-party complaint, there may
be good reason to prefer the more cumbersome method of requiring the
filing of an independent action against the third party to commence the
proceedings. Under I.R.C.P. 14(a), a motion for leave to file a third-party
complaint, even if the proposed complaint is attached to the motion, does not
give any notice to the third party that it may be subject to an impending
action. Because the third party would not be served with the motion for leave
to file a third-party complaint, the third party may discover, after the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, that a previously filed
motion to which the third party had no notice, commenced the proceedings.
Such a rule is contrary to the purposes of any statute of limitations, which
functions to prevent stale claims and to protect a defendant's reasonable
expectation that his earlier conduct can no longer give rise to liability. See
Hawley v. Green, 117 ldaho 498, 501, 788 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1990). However, the
same rationale does not apply in this case. As mentioned above, Idaho
Mutual was served with the motion for leave to amend, as well as the
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proposed amended complaint. Idaho Mutual, unlike a party that has not
been joined, had notice of the substance of the proposed amendment before
the six-month period expired under Idaho Code section 45-510.
Consequently, Griggs is distinguishable because this case does not present the
same notice concern.
Terra-Tf7est, Inc. v. Idaho -1lfutual Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393~ 399~400, 24 7 P .3d 620,

626-27 (2010) ( emphasis added).
Plaintiffs comparison to a defendant named in an original complaint as opposed to
a proposed defendant in a motion to amend are vastly different situations. In the case of
an original complaint the defendants have been formally named presumably within the
applicable statute oflimitations. By virtue of the filing, formal notice is given that the
defendants are part of a legal action. The plaintiffs are then required to serve the timely
filed complaint upon the defendants within a certain amount of time mandated by rule.
Defendants have a certain defined amount of time in which they can reasonably rely
upon.
However, a simple request for leave to amend does not place potential thirdparties on notice that they are involved in a legal action. In fact, the rule proposed by
Plaintiffs would ensure that potential third-parties would never receive notice that they
might be potentially involved in a legal action and would set no time limit as to when a
third pmty could be dragged into the lawsuit. Conceivably, under Plaintiffs proposal a
Plaintiff could file a motion to amend the day before the applicable statute oflimitations
was set to expire, the court could wait a year to rule on the motion (much like the district
court in Griggs), and then the unwitting party could be dragged into a lawsuit one year
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after the statute of limitations has expired: there is no set timetable like there is with
original complaints. Hence, this situation is more closely aligned to and should be treated
like the situation of where a party is attempting to add a new party to a lawsuit using the
relate back doctrine of LR.C.P. 15(c), which specifically requires that the party to be
added receives notice of the institution of the action within the applicable statute of
limitations.
Further, unlike an original complaint, the court is not bound to grant a request for
leave to amend. Thus, the two situations are vastly different and the notice concerns
addressed by this Court in Terra-West, Inc. are valid. Accordingly, Plaintiffs proposed
rule should be rejected.
3. Just because some jurisdictions have a different rule than Idaho's concerning
the commencement of an action is not a valid reason to overturn wellestablished Idaho law. Contrarv to Plaintiffs assertion. the notice concerns
addressed by this Court in Terra-West. Inc. are shared bv other jurisdictions.
Plaintiffs' final argument in support of their proposal to overturn established
Idaho case law precedent with regard to the commencement of an action is that other
jurisdictions have established a rule different than Idaho's and so we should change our
rule. The only argument posited by Plaintiffs in support of such a position is that other
jurisdictions do not share the notice concerns addressed by this Court in Terra-West, Inc.
However. if one takes closer look at the cases actually cited in the page long footnote of
pages 35-36 of Plaintiffs' brief one discovers that, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, many
jurisdictions share the same notice concerns this Court discussed in Terra-West, Inc.
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One of Plaintiffs' most prominently cited cases throughout their brief, hett v. Bellucci,
774

.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2002), is a perfect example. Said case was two certified questions from

the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a diversity action to determine under
Massachusetts law when an action is commenced against a party who is added by way of
amendment to the complaint. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that as far as
Massachusetts law was concerned the operative date for commencement of an action for
purposes of their statutes of repose was the date of filing a motion for leave to amend a
complaint to add a party. Id. at 143. However, the party to be added to the amended complaint

"was served with the motion to amend, and was informed that it had been filed with the
court, prior to the expiration of the statute of repose." Id. at 138 (emphasis added). In fact,
as the Massachusetts Supreme Court noted:

Local rule 15.l(b) requires that the motion to amend be served on the
proposed defendant prior to the filing of the motion, a rule that guarantees
service on the defendant prior to the expiration of the statute of repose,
without even the slight flexibility for service provided by rule 4(i). In other
words, whereas timely commencement of an action by the filing of the complaint
does not necessarily translate into notification to the defendant until sometime
after the expiration of the repose period, the requirement of prior service under
the local rule ensures notification prior to the expiration of the repose period.
With that notice and filing, such a defendant is made aware, within the
repose period, of the fact that the plaintiff is bringing suit for the alleged
prior conduct.
Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
Obviously, the fact that the party to be added by the amended complaint was required to
receive and did receive the motion to amend prior to its filing with the court and prior to the
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expiration of the statute of repose evidences the fact that Massachusetts shares the same notice
concerns voiced by this Court in Terra-West. Inc.
Similarly, as cited previously in this brief (and as reco 6rnized by this Court in Terra-West,

Inc.) in Rademaker v. E.D. Fzvnn Export Co., 17 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1927) "central to the comi's
analysis was the fact that the defendant had been served with the motion prior to the expiration
of the statute oflimitations, and the motion "fully and comprehensively" laid out the substance
of the proposed amendment." Terra-West, Inc., 150 Idaho at 399,247 P.3d at 626. In Simpson

v. Hatteras Island Gallery Restaurant, Inc., 427 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) the court notes
that the hearing on the motion to amend to add a new party to the action was continued twice at
the request of the counsel for the paity to be added by the motion to amend. Id. at 138.
Obviously notice and most likely service of the motion to amend and the proposed amended
complaint had been effected on the proposed new party or else its counsel could not have
requested two continuances of the hearing.
Colorado, who by Plaintiffs own admission, has a similar rule or statute to Idaho
governing commencement of claims has had its Courts of Appeal issue a decision
acknowledging notice concerns:
In summary, we hold that if, before the expiration of the appropriate statute of
limitations, a plaintiff files a motion to amend accompanied by an amended
complaint pursuant to C.R.C.P. 15(a). and if the motion [and] amended complaint
... are served on a defendant before expiration of the statute of limitations, then
the statute of limitations is tolled until the trial court rules on plaintiffs motions.

Moore v. Grossman, 824 P.2d 7, 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).
New York has similar notice concerns:
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... The court has ruled that where a plaintiff has served the notice of motion and
proposed amended complaint upon a third-party defendant prior to the expiration
of the three-year State of Limitations the cause of action was timely interposed.
(Allstate Ins. Co. v. Emsco Homes, 93 A.D.2d 874.) However, the court has ruled
that where the proposed amended complaint was contained in a surreply which
was not sent to the new proposed defendant (where there was no third-party
claim) until after the Statute of Limitations had expired, the new cause of
action was denied untimely. ( Gagliardi v. NeH· York City Housing Auth., 88
A.D.2d 610.)
Landi v. We 're Assoc., 124 Misc. 2d 331, 335-336 (N.Y. Sup. 1983) (emphasis added).
Pennsylvania, when faced by similar request from a litigant to change the law as
Plaintiffs are doing in this case, responded and held as follows:
In Pennsylvania, actions for personal injuries must be brought within two years.
Plaintiffs concede. as they must that the procedure employed to add
manufacturers as defendants in this case was not calculated to give notice to these
defendants that a claim was being made against them until after the period for
filing suit had expired. Plaintiffs nevertheless urge this court to adopt a new rule
declaring that statutes of limitations are tolled by the filing of a petition for leave
to amend in the trial court. We decline plaintiffs' offer.

In this case, the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to commence a timely
action against the additional manufacturers in the manner provided by the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. The rules were promulgated to
promote uniformity and to provide procedural due process for all litigants.
Rather than adopt an ad hoc exception to the rules and the decisions
interpreting those rules, we hold, consistent with prior appellate court
decisions, that an action is commenced only by filing with the prothonotary a
praecipe for writ of summons, a complaint, or an agreement for an amicable
action. Therefore, we affirm the judgment entered by the trial court.
Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595,598, 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (internal citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
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Further, notice concerns in the present situation are much like the notice concerns
presented in a Rule 15( c) relate-back situation where a party to be added after the expiration of
the statute oflimitations must have notice of the institution of the action against it prior to the
expiration of the applicable statute oflimitations. In both cases, previously unnamed parties are
being allowed to be added to lawsuits after the statute oflimitations has expired and thus it is
logical and appropriate that such parties have actual notice of the institution of the action prior to
the running of the statute of limitations against them. Therefore, the rationale and holding of
Curry v. Turner, 832 So. 2d 508, 510-513 (Miss. 2002) (wherein the Mississippi Supreme Court

held it was proper to dismiss new defendants added to an amended complaint which was filed
after the applicable statute of limitations had expired) is valid and persuasive.
In this case, Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to commence a timely action against
EIRMC and Dr. Taylor in the manner provided by Idaho law as outlined above in Section
F .1. It was Plaintiffs failure to follow Idaho law which caused them to end up in federal
court in the first place. This Court should not adopt an ad hoc exception to Idaho's rules
and the Idaho case law interpreting those rules for Plaintiffs who failed to follow Idaho
law in the first place. In addition, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the notice concerns
addressed by this Court in Terra-Tfrest, Inc. are shared by several jurisdictions as set forth
above. Accordingly, EIRMC requests that this Court reject Plaintiffs' invitation to
overturn its decisions in Griggs and Terra-West, Inc. and affirm the district court's
Opinion and Order Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and
Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration.
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EIRMC is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-121 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules
This Court has held that a party is "entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC.
§ 12-121 if this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or

pursued fiivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133
Idaho 105, 109-110, 982 P.2d 940,944 (1999). In this case, dismissal of Plaintiffs'
action was the result of Plaintiffs failing to follow Idaho law and failing to commence
their action against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor within the applicable statute oflimitations.
Griggs v. Nash has been good case law since 1989 and Terra-West, Inc. was decided in

2010 yet Plaintiffs ignored both cases. Plaintiffs' arguments with regard to federal law
are without foundation and contrary to over seventy-five years of lJ.S. and federal law
case law precedent as set forth above.
Likewise, Plaintiffs call for a change in Idaho law is unreasonable based upon the
fact that had they simply followed Idaho law in the first place they could have avoided
untimely commencing their lawsuit against EIRMC and Dr. Taylor. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' appeal was brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation. Consequently, EIRMC is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to Erie and over seventy-five (75) years of U.S. Supreme Court and
federal case law precedent there is no question that Idaho state law governs this matter.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 3(a) and this Court's holding in Griggs v. Nash an action does not
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commence against a newly added defendant in a lawsuit until the actual filing of
complaint. Pursuant to Terra-TiVest, Inc. r. Idaho Mutual Trust.

a motion to amend a

complaint only commences the proceedings against an unnamed party if the party to be
added received notice of the impending action by receiving a copy of the motion to
amend and/or proposed amended complaint prior to the expiration of the applicable
statute of limitations.
In this case, Plaintiff failed on both accounts. Plaintiffs filed their second
amended complaint, adding EIRMC and Dr. Taylor as parties, after the applicable statute
of limitations had expired and did not serve EIRMC with a copy of the motion to amend
or proposed amended complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Thus,
Plaintiffs' action against EIRMC is barred as a matter oflaw. Accordingly, EIRMC
respectfully requests that this Court: 1) Affirm the district court's Opinion and Order
Granting Medical Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment; 2) Affirm the district
court's Opinion and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration; and 3) Grant
EIRMC its attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

..., afi-i
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